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Whether judged as men, philosophers, or writers, it would be difficult to 
imagine two persons more different than Voltaire and Rousseau, yet they 
were both literary giants of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment who 
believed they had devoted most of their adult lives to the cause of political 
and moral freedom and justice. 
Voltaire was the beneficiary of a formal classical education that served as 
a solid base to his broad cultural background and wide reading. He un- 
abashedly enjoyed the flourishing eighteenth-century salon life with its pre- 
mium on wit, conversational skills, and intellect. And despite his capacities 
for strong emotions, his manner of coping with the overriding problen~ of 
injustice was through the exercise of reason and intellect. Theodore Bester- 
man informs us in his recent biography of Voltaire: "The truth is that this 
nlost profound conviction (i.e., love of justice) was the fruit of Voltaire's 
reason, but it was expressed with all the deepest passions of his being.. . . 
Indeed, Voltaire was utterly a man of the mind."' 
Rousseau, on the other hand, possessed neither the classical education nor 
the broad systematic learning of Voltaire, though he was an unusually well- 
read autodidact in the eyes of Marguerite Reichenburg.' What is more 
important, Rousseau was by nature much more introverted than his extra- 
verted contenlporary, lacked Voltaire's conversational skills and sharp wit, 
and what is more, notwithstanding his protestations, was almost totally 
devoid of a sense of humor. He himself would probably have admitted that 
in his youth he had sold his soul to a Mephistophelian Paris. He might not 
have as readily admitted that once success clearly appeared unobtainable, 
he attenlpted to repurchase his soul at too high and exacting a price for his 
body to comply with impunity to the demands of his conscience and heart. 
Notwithstanding the obvious contrasts in thought and life-style, each con- 
tributed dramatically to the struggle waged in behaIf of the common man. 
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Voltaire, though himself a victim of injustice and intolerance, was driven by 
a conscience which could not remain mute even when he personally no longer 
had much cause for fear. Indeed, the greatest efforts in his nlighty crusade 
to eliminate intolerance and injustice were put forth while he was safely 
and luxuriously ensconced in Switzerland or near the Swiss border at 
Ferney. Rousseau was different; he dramatically and deliberately became 
one of the "deprived," thereby creating a greater identification with the 
masses and giving greater authenticity to his exhortations to seek one's 
importance and greatness within oneself instead of attaching undue impor- 
tance to the externals of class or wealth. In appealing to man's inner dignity 
and identity, he sounded a clarion call against all governmental and societal 
laws or conventions that demeaned man or placed unjust burdens upon 
him. In the words of Jean Lecercle, "la nourriture qu'il apporte ii cette 
generation n'est pas seulement d'ordre moral. I1 eveille l'humanitarisme 
qui est un sentiment pre-revolutionnaire I1 suscite le dksir de venir en 
aide aux hommes, d'amCliorer leur sort sur terre."' On the same page we 
find him saying: "VoilB le fait decisif; la petite bourgeoisie reconnait dans 
Rousseau Pun des siens. EIle admire Voltaire, mais elle aime Jean-Jacques 
tendrement." The reason is obvious, he was appealing to the "have-nots" 
condemned to leading miserable lives who suddenly found a champion 
with whom they could identify at several levels, even that of illiteracy, since 
Rousseau decried the advantages of education, books, and culture. What 
is more, his insistence that "le coeur de l'homme juste"' should replace 
wealth and social position as the proper criterion of a man's worth enabled 
the average man to aspire to greater things socialIy and politicalIy. Thus 
while Voltaire was waging war against specific inequities Rousseau was 
inspiring the masses with hope and pride in their dignity as human beings. 
Basically their different outlooks stemmed from the fact that Rousseau was 
an idealistic moralist, whether in ethics, politics, or society, whereas Voltaire, 
the realist and pragmatist, was more prepared to compromise, as demon- 
strated in Bcibouc. It should be noted that before Rousseau had imprisoned 
himself into a fixed position through his well-publicized transformation, his 
admiration for Voltaire was boundless, as his letter to Vernes makes clear. 
He wrote his friend: "Quand vous negligez de voir ce premier ecrivain de 
son sikcle, vous ne connoissez pas tout le sacrifice que vous faites 2 la vertu; 
car il n'est pas seulement le plus be1 esprit, mais le plus aimable des hommes 
en societk, et si l'on pouvait commercer avec son esprit seulement, il faudrait 
passer la vie 2 ses genoux. Pour rnoi, quoi qu'on en puisse dire, je connois 
l'acharnement de la jalousie, et j'ai peine 2 cider aux funestes impressions 
qu'on cherche B nous donner de son caractkre. On ne peint point comme 
il a fait les charmes de la vertu et les douceurs de l'amitie sans avoir un coeur 
propre it sentir I'une et I'autre."' 
UnIike Rousseau, who believed that an individual is most truly himself 
VOLTAIRE AND ROUSSEAU 85 
when he feels, Voltaire was convinced that thought and knowledge brought 
out the uniqueness of the individual. In a word, he preferred to the Socratic 
thesis that knowledge is virtue, the contention that knowledge is power, and 
throughout his life he utilized this aspect of his humanism to support his 
humanitarianism; that is, his innumerable humanitarian deeds were his 
humanism translated into action. Clearly for Voltaire, as much as for any 
other "philosophe," humanism was, as Larousse defines it, "l'ensemble des 
tendances intellectuelles et philosophiques qui ont pour objet le deve- 
loppement des qualites essentielles de l'homme." And both the humanist and 
humanitarian in Voltaire insisted upon man's answerability to human condi- 
tions for his actions and uItimate perfectibility instead of seeking solutions 
in Divine powers. This was in keeping with the humanistic aspect of eigh- 
teenth-century thought that accepted the fact that the physiological oneness 
of man created a terrestrial kinship dependent on Man-man rather than 
God-man. 
In short, Voltaire continuously preached a faith in social realism without 
necessarily trying to undermine the "bienseances" still prevalent during the 
eighteenth century. Jean-Jacques, on the other hand, found the "bienseances" 
which continued to rule society and determine men's actions an obstacle to 
the acceptance of a psychological and moral realism. Voltaire's greater recep- 
tivity for "biens~ances" did not prevent him from being the better repre- 
sentative of the eighteenth-century emphasis upon "bienfaisance," for he 
thought in terms of man as a unit of society, whereas Rousseau empathized 
more with the individual as an entity unto himself. Indeed, Rousseau crit- 
icized the "philosophes" in his "Second Discourse" for being more concerned 
with society than for the suffering of individuals. The quotation of Rousseau 
reads: "I1 n'y a plus que les dangers de la socikte entikre qui troublent le 
som~neil tranquille du Philosophe, et qui l'arrachent de son lit. On peut 
impunkment egorger son semblable sous sa fenestre, il n'a qu'B mettre ses 
mains sur ses oreilles et s'argumenter un peu, pour empCcher la Nature qui 
se rtvolte en lui, de l'identifier avec celui qu'on assassine. L'homme Sauvage 
n'a point cet admirable talent et faute de sagesse et de raison, on le voit 
toujours se Iivrer etourdiment au premier sentiment de 1'H~manitC.''~ 
Rousseau did in truth later recognize that any amelioration of man's "de- 
naturalized" state would have to be accomplished within and by thevery social 
and political system that had corrupted and depraved "l'homme naturel." 
That explains his many works on political systems and theories of govern- 
ment, but his primary interest remained the same, that is, a concern for the 
individual human being. Analogically, one could say that he had reached 
the position of the scientist who realized that the best way to combat a disease 
was to inoculate the patient with a better controlled specimen of the virus. 
There is much truth in this basic distinction made between Voltaire and 
Rousseau, namely, thatvoltaire was primarily concerned with the total social, 
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political, and religious atmosphere and intent on maintaining conditions 
which precluded or made improbable the existence of intolerance, injustice, 
and abuse. One can say, then, with some justice, that even in the vehement 
battles waged in the name of particular individuals, Voltaire's eye was always 
on the larger scene; Calas, Sirven, or Chevalier de La Barre served as exam- 
ples and beacons as n~uch  as ends in themselves. In essence, Bertrand de 
Jouvenel echoed Voltaire's sentiment when he recently stated, "sans le 
groupe, point d'homme."' By contrast, Rousseau's temperament and emo- 
tional sensitivity would have led him to become more invoIved with the 
individual victim of injustice or poverty, that is, if he had become involved 
actively. For the truth is that, as he himself so often recognized and admitted, 
he seldom if ever entered the lists to participate actively in the "philosophic" 
struggle against the forces of oppression. More specifically, on several occa- 
sions he confessed that he had performed few good actions in his life (see 
Rgveries dupronzenet~r-solitaire, 1, 1059) and had refrained even when he not 
only was capable of such actions, but actually would have wished to perform 
them (ibid., I, 1051). The reason was rooted in selfishness; he did not wish 
to be placed in the position of feeling that he had to repeat such actions. 
At least, this was his rationalization. 
What Voltaire, "the first great man of letters who used his fame and literary 
skill in the active promotion of his social convictions" (Besterman, Voltrrire, 
p. 539), condemned in Rousseau was the extension of this egotistical attitude 
of non-involvement, or non-participation in the philosophic cause, to a 
betrayal of the "philosophes" themselves. Rousseau represented more than 
a liability or a threat. He became a wasted asset, for Voltaire recognized 
Rousseau's appeal to the masses, a trait likewise acknowledged by dYAlembert 
when hc warned Voltaire not to denounce Rousseau publicly, "surtout B 
Paris, car Jean Jacques y est un peu le roi des Halles."" 
When we compare the humanism of Rousseau wit11 that of Voltaire, it is 
clear that the latter from both a classical as well as philosophical concept 
of humanism far exceeded that of his more egocentric and paranoid contenz- 
porary. True, humanism and humanitarianism, especially in Voltaire, were 
understandably intermingled. Still, if humanism, when contrasted with 
lzumanitarianism, does indeed imply culture, civilization, and intellectual 
interests, then Voltaire surpassed by far the more restricted humanism of a 
Rousseau, whose tirades against these aspects of humanism are too well 
known to bear repeating. 
It is interesting to note their approach to and concern for the written word, 
without doubt one of the distinguishing attributes of man's superiority over 
beasts and an important indication of man's progress toward development 
of his uniqueness or qualities essentially associated with the human species. 
Voltaire, the classical humanist, deplored any deviation from the purity of 
the language, for this symbolized the supremacy of man and attested to the 
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degree with which man had achieved mastery of his thought processes. Rous- 
seau, regardless of the importance wl~ich has since been accorded to his flow- 
ing style, did seem to attach more importance to the moral impact his work 
conveyed than the stylistic felicitousness or purity with which it was 
expressed. One need onlyrecall two Ietters to his publisher, Marc-Michel Rey. 
In that of March 6, 1760, he insisted: "Que l'on corrige exactenlent Ies fautes 
de l'imprimeur, mais surtout qu'on laisse toutes les miennes. On doit croire 
que je sais assez de franqais pour avoir rendu l'ouvrage plus correct, si j e l'avois 
voulu."" On October 23, 1761, his injunction to the publisher was: "mais 
qu'on suive partout le manuscrit a la lettre, jusques dans les fautes."'" 
The style of Rousseau offended and outraged the classicist and humanist 
in Voltaire almost as much as his ideas did. For example, he devoted four 
entire Ietters to a rather detailed vitrolic and satiric attack upon the No~~velle 
Hiloi'se, letters which Voltaire pretended had been written to him. He also 
condemned Emile for its "Cternitis et longueurs insoutenables," while still 
managing to acknowledge "de la force dans le stile."" Finally, Voltaire, the 
master craftsman, could have only scorn for any writer who openly confessed 
that he could write only when moved by passion, 
Literature, the highest expression of man's humanistic effort for Voltaire, 
notwithstanding his polemical and propagandistic bias, became meaningful 
for Rousseau only insofar as it carried a social and moral message, But one 
should add, of course, that all of Jean-Jacques's works were designed to bare 
his soul and to justify his positions on various matters. In the words of Jean 
Fabre: "Jamais, en effet, ecrivain n'eut moins de consideration pour ce qui 
n'est que litterature."" This same view was upheld by Jean Gukhenno when 
he said ofRousseau's written works: "I1 etait bien question d'art ou de IittCra- 
ture! I1 s'agissait de la vie m&me. . . . I1 est le premier en Europe de ces 
Ccrivains la'iques 5i qui, dans l a  decadence de la foi, les hommes aient 
demande ce que jadis ils attendaient de leurs directe~rs."'~ 
The  basic difference between Voltaire and Rousseau with regard to 
humanism's emphasis upon knowledge, progress, and refinement of man's 
life at all levels centered upon the relationship of these to man's genuine 
happiness. To Rousseau's mind nothing surpassed the simple and individ- 
ualistic happiness and freedom of "l'homme naturel." Voltaire could not 
imagine himself happy without the benefits of the refinement and culture 
that represented the results of social progress. For example, if both suddenly 
emerged upon our twentieth-century scene, one can have little doubt that 
Voltaire would approve of the expenditures and dangers associated with the 
exploration of outer space, whereas Rousseau would, with equal fervor, 
oppose them. The primordial right and obligation of man, would have said 
Rousseau, the humanist-moralist, was to explore the universe within himself 
which society with its trappings was succeeding in destroying or obscuring. 
Unlike Rousseau, Voltaire did not find it either desirable or expedient to 
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adopt the role of a Messiah, martyr, or moral touchstone in order to combat 
persecution, intolerance, and injustice. Nor did he find it necessary to apolo- 
gize for his wealth, his love of luxury, or the wealthy friends whom he repea- 
tedly utilized in waging his campaigns, the humanist on such occasions will- 
ingly yielding to the humanitarian. 
Another definition of humanism holds it to be a philosophy that augments 
human values through man's efforts apart from God; that is, God is neither 
essential nor indispensable. Phrased differently, "the champion of man 
against cosmic absorption is Humanism. . . . Humanism is that view which 
vindicates the integrity of man." Based on the religious aspect of the above 
definition, Voltaire would certainly qualify as the greater humanist, for few 
would deny that Rousseau was more religious than Voltaire, who according 
to Theodore Besterman "was all his life a mercilessly unremitting enemy not 
only of the church but of Christianity and of all religion" (Voltaire, p. 529). 
This does not mean that Voltaire was devoid of all religious experience, for 
virtually every humanist would agree that a "religious" experience is possible 
without a belief in God, just as most humanists would agree with Gabriel-Rey 
that for the humanist "morale et religion ne sont pas nkcessairement likes."" 
A divorce between ethics and religion was unquestionably more acceptable 
to Voltaire than to Rousseau, who fully expected to be rewarded by Provi- 
dence for his life of virtue, as he clearly stipulated in his Lettre sur- la Provi- 
derzce. 
Humanism, Jacques Maritain also tells us, "tend essentiellement i rendre 
17homme plus vrain~ent humain, et A manifester sa grandeur originelle en 
Ie faisant participer B tout ce qui peut l'enrichir dans la nature et dans l'his- 
toire."'" Here the stress is upon the integrity of man that combines the self- 
identity and dignity which Rousseau so deeply cherished and which he saw 
constantly subjected to erosion in a social setting. Voltaire shared Rousseau's 
condemnation of the corrosive and corruptive capabilities of social and polit- 
ical agencies, but unlike Rousseau, he was as dismayed by the religious preju- 
dice and bigotry rampant in eighteenth-century France, as he was by the civil 
and political inequities. And because Voltaire rejected Divine intercession, 
accepted in large measure by Rousseau, he was more apt to reject the rational- 
ism of absolutism and inflexibility. 
Like his fellow "philosophes," Voltaire believed that all conclusions are 
provisional and therefore man must be prepared to reshape his life and beliefs 
to adjust to new situations and conditions. This type of philosophy, premised 
on a fundamental humanism, precluded any commitment to a metaphysic 
rooted in dogma, This accounts for Voltaire's contempt for all metaphysical 
solutions and speculations that inspired some of his most satiric thrusts, 
though of course his ever-questioning intellect never ceased to wonder about 
man and, as in Le Philosophe ignorant, to ask innumerable questions which 
have for all time plagued mankind. 
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Rousseau, by contrast, was more at ease with positions rooted in absolutes 
and dogmatism, particularly following his so-called transformation, after 
which he became even more convinced of the righteousness and correctness 
of his moral view. His intransigent idealism and the certitude of his moral 
position impeded him from making the concessions every human being 
invariably is called upon to make in life. Rousseau thus overlooked one ines- 
capable truth: "le plus idealiste risque d7$tre le plus grand menteur. Les 
lunettes de I'idCal ne nous trompent jan~ais mieux que sur nous-mCme~,"'~ 
However much Rousseau pretended to identify with the masses, the 
impression lingers that he was not personally preoccupied with the fate of 
either individuals (other than himself) or of society as a whole. More specifi- 
cally, the humanitarian instinct was missing from the humanism that moti- 
vated every action and work 01 Rousseau. Contrast this with the humani- 
tarian focus of Voltaire's life, so \\,ell proclaimed by Paul Valery in his talk 
on Voltaire given at the Sorbonne in 1944, when he characterized Voltaire 
as "an% et defenseur du genre h~lmain." '~ An outstanding example of the 
humanitarian impulse that underlay Voltaire's amelioristic philosophy can 
be seen in his significant contribution to the reform of the penal code, of 
which one recent critic said: "le plus original et l'essentiel de sa contribution 
B la reforme du droit penal ce fut la faqon dont il se passionna et dont il 
apprit aux autres A se passionner pour la justice, non pas cette justice idkale 
dont il etait question dans les illercuriales de Daguesseau, mais la justice qui 
atteint ou protege Ies hommes, dans leur chair.'"' 
Nor should one be misled by Voltaire's often frivolous, light and satirical 
style. Nothing more accurately holds up the mirror to the written works of 
Rousseau and Voltaire than the latter's following short comment to Jacob 
Vernes: "Jean-Jacques n'ecrit que pour h i r e  et moy j'ecris pour agir."'" And 
in truth a virtual monomania drove his pen; his mask of frivolity concealed 
a deadly seriousness, as he explained to MouItou: 'tje me dis toujours, il faut 
tiicher qu'on te lise sans dCgoilt; c'est par le plaisir qu'on vient A bout des 
hommes; repands quelques poignees de sel et ds6pices dans le ragofit que 
tu leur presentes, mCle la ridicule aux raisons, t k h e  de faire naitre l'indif- 
fkrence, alors tu obtiendras sOrement la tolCrance."'l 
The constant goal in Voltaire's campaign, culminating in his famous "ecra- 
sez-l'inf2me," was the welfare of mankind. The instruments to accomplish 
this goal were reason and conscience. Rousseau not only minimized the role 
of reason, he often actually considered it a liability. For example, in a letter 
to the Marquis de Mirabeau he attacked Saint-Pierre's support of the 
Moderns' position "que la raison humaine alloit toujours en se perfection- 
nant, attendu que chaque siecle ajoute ses lumikres A celles des sigcles prece- 
dens. I1 ne voyoit pas [Rousseau insisted] que l'entendement humain n'a 
toujours qu'une meme mesure et trCs ktroite, qu'il perd d'un c6tk tout autant 
qu'il gagne de l'autre, et que des prejuges toujours renaissans nous Btent 
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autant de lumikres acquises que la raison cultivke ne peut r empla~e r . "~  As 
for conscience, Rousseau always thought in terms of his own conscience, 
which infaIlibly dictated whether something was right or wrong. Voltaire 
sometimes sounded as though he shared this view of Rousseau (see Pobme 
sur la Loi Naturelle), but generally and more typically he appealed to the 
collective conscience of mankind. 
Because of their diametrically opposed natures and philosophies, there 
could be little in common between Voltaire, the highly civilized, cultured, 
educated, and refined gentleman with a firm belief in the benefits of society 
and the idea of social progress, and Rousseau, the adamant defender of the 
pre-social man, or "l'homme naturel," for whom self-interest and genera1 
interest were mutually exclusive. The morality of "l'homme naturel" would 
have been anathema to Voltaire, because it precluded not only "bienfai- 
sance," so dear to his humanitarian heart, but equally important the "bien- 
seance" cherished by the humanist. 
Voltaire's indispensable intellectual, moral, and philosophical interests 
were incompatible with the pre-social state of man. And he was convinced 
that human qualities could best be developed within social settings. TO be 
sure, Rousseau did profess in his "Fragments politiques" that moral man 
could be achieved only within a social context: "En un mot, ce n'est qu'en 
devenant sociable qu'il devient un Ctre moral, un animal raisonnable, le roi 
des autres animaux, et l'image de Dieu sur la terre" (PIeiade 111 [1964], 477). 
It is clear, however, that he was rationalizing the best possible arrangclllellt 
he could find within the existing unacceptable social and political structure. 
Only in this sense was Ernst Cassirer correct in saying that Rousseau's real 
originality and significance stemmed from his having devoted all his thinking 
to the problem of law and ~ociety.'~ 
Whenever some writing of Rousseau struck a common chord with the 
philosophical cause, Voltaire inserted some form of limited approval among 
his customary attacks. Typical is the following comment on En~ile: "Sans 
doute il faut se rejouir que Jean Jacques ait osC dire ce que tous les honnCtes 
gens pensent et ce qu'ils devraient dire tous les jours. Mais ce miserable n'en 
est que plus coupable d'avoir insulte ses amis et ses bienfaiteurs. Sa conduite 
fait honte z i  la philosophie. . . . Pour une trentaine de pages qui se trouvent 
dans un livre inlisible qui sera oublie dans un mois, je ne vois pas qu'il nous 
ait fait grand bien" (Leigh ed., letter 1986 to D'Alembert, 12 July 1762, XII, 
21). 
Voltaire reluctantly had to acknowledge what Jean Cuehenno recently 
observed about Rousseau, that he was "le premier en Europe de ces ecrivains 
layques qui, dans la decadence de la foi, les hommes aient demandk, ce 
que jadis ils attendaient de leurs 'directeurs.' "".' Voltaire at least partially 
concurred when he wrote Damilaville: "Ne considkrons point sa personne, 
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considkrons sa cause. Jamais les droits de 17humanitC n'ont CtC plus soutenus" 
(Best. 10556 /1960], 23 Aug. 1763, LII, 249). 
Critics of Voltaire might justifiably argue that his attacks upon Rousseau 
and his denunciation of Rousseau's moral posture as hypocritical and  
dishonest were subconsciously an attempt to disguise the extent to wl~icli his 
own defense of hunlan rights were intellectual and depersonalized. He was 
painfully aware of the fact that Rousseau's success resulted from the people's 
conviction that Rousseau was really one of them and that their nlisery and 
concern were deeply shared by him. No doubt Voltaire would be more 
vitriolic if he were able to witness Rousseau's even greater success in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The numbers are legion of Rousseau's 
disciples who are convinced of the sincerity and efficacy of his struggles 
to achieve for individual man the integrity and dignity he ostensibly prized 
more than material wealth and public acclaim. 
Today, in this seemingly anti-rationalistic age, the siren call of Rousseau 
continues to enchant more and more those l~steners who remain oblivious 
to the discordant notes struck by "cet extravagant n~usicie~i," while the uni- 
versal genius of a great humanist and humanitarian like Voltaire temporarily 
suffers what may be ternled a fashionable disparagement. In the long span 
of history, however, the very dissimilar Voltaire and Rousseau will both be 
judged to have made, each in his ownway, a major contribution to humanistic 
progress and humanitaria11 achievements. 
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